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Abstract-
 
Perturbation is a very useful technique where the data is modified and made ‘less sensitive´ 
before being handed to agents. For example, one can add random noise to certain attributes, or one 
can replace exact values by ranges. However, in some cases it is important not to alter the original 
distributor’s data. For example, if an outsourcer is doing our payroll, he must have the exact salary 
and customer bank account numbers. If medical researchers will be treating patients (as opposed to 
simply computing statistics), they may need accurate data for the patients. Traditionally, leakage 
detection is handled by watermarking, e.g., a unique code is embedded in each distributed copy. If 
that copy is later discovered in the hands of an unauthorized party, the leaker can be identified. 
Watermarks can be very useful in some cases, but again, involve some modification of the original 
data. Furthermore, watermarks can sometimes be destroyed if the data recipient is malicious. In this 
paper we study unobtrusive techniques for detecting leakage of a set of objects or records. 
Specifically we study the following scenario: After giving a set of objects to agents, the distributor 
discovers some of those same objects in an unauthorized place. 
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Abstract-
 
Perturbation is a very useful technique where the 
data is modified and made ‘less sensitive´ before being 
handed to agents. For example, one can add random noise to 
certain attributes, or one can replace exact values by ranges. 
However, in some cases it is important not to alter the original 
distributor’s data. For example, if an outsourcer is doing our 
payroll, he must have the exact salary and customer bank 
account numbers.   If   medical    researchers    will    be 
treating patients (as opposed to simply computing statistics), 
they may need accurate data for  the patients. Traditionally, 
leakage detection is handled by watermarking, e.g., a unique 
code is embedded in each distributed copy. If that copy is 
later discovered in the hands of an unauthorized party, the 
leaker can be identified. Watermarks can be very useful in 
some cases, but again, involve some modification of the 
original data. Furthermore, watermarks can sometimes be 
destroyed if the data recipient is malicious. In this paper we 
study unobtrusive techniques for detecting leakage of a set of 
objects or records. Specifically we study the following 
scenario: After giving a set of objects to agents, the distributor 
discovers some of those same objects in an unauthorized 
place.
 I.
 
Introduction
 n the course of doing business, sometimes sensitive 
data must be handed over to supposedly trusted third 
parties. For example, a hospital may
 
give patient 
records to researchers who will  devise  new treatments. 
Similarly, a company may have partnerships with other 
companies that require sharing customer
 
data.  Another  
enterprise   may   outsource its data processing, so data 
must be given to various other companies. We call the 
owner of the data the distributor and the supposedly 
trusted third parties the agents. Our goal is to detect 
when the distributor’s sensitive data has been leaked by 
agents, and if possible to identify the agent that leaked 
the data.
 
The distributor can assess the likelihood that 
the leaked data came from one or more agents, as 
opposed   to   having   been   independently gathered 
by
 
other means. Using an analogy with cookies stolen  
from a cookie jar, if we catch Freddie with a single 
cookie, he can argue that a friend gave him the cookie. 
But if we catch Freddie with 5 cookies, it will be much 
harder for him to argue that his hands were not in the 
cookie jar. If the distributor sees ‘enough evidence´ that 
an agent leaked
 
data, he may stop doing business with 
him, or may initiate legal proceedings.  In this paper  we  
develop  a model for assessing the ‘guilt´ of agents. We 
also present algorithms for  distributing  objects  to  
agents, in  a  way  that  improves  our  chances  of  
identifying  a leaker. Finally, we also consider the option  
of  adding ‘fake´ objects to the distributed set. Such 
objects do not correspond to real entities but appear 
realistic    to the agents. In a sense, the fake objects 
acts as a type of watermark for the entire set, without  
modifying  any individual members. If it turns out an 
agent was given one or more fake objects that were 
leaked, then the distributor can be more confident that 
agent was guilty[1]. 
The distributor may be able to add fake objects 
to the distributed data in order to improve his 
effectiveness in detecting guilty agents. However, fake 
objects may impact the correctness of what agents do, 
so they may not always be allowable[1]. The idea of 
perturbing data to detect leakage is not new, e.g.,. 
However, in most cases, individual objects are 
perturbed, e.g., by adding random noise to sensitive 
salaries, or adding a watermark to an image. In our  
case, we are perturbing the set of distributor objects by 
adding fake elements. In some applications, fake 
objects may cause fewer problems that perturbing real 
objects. For example, say the distributed data objects 
are medical records and the agents are hospitals. In this 
case, even small modifications to the records of actual 
patients may be undesirable. However, the addition of 
some fake medical records may be acceptable, since 
no patient matches these records, and hence no one 
will ever be treated based on fake records. Our use of 
fake objects is inspired by the use of ‘trace´ records in 
mailing lists. 
In this case, company  A  sells  to  company  B 
a mailing list to be used once (e.g., to send 
advertisements). Company A adds trace records that 
contain addresses  owned  by  company  A.  Thus, each 
time company Buses the purchased mailing list, A 
receives copies of the mailing. These records area type 
of fake objects that help identify improper use of data. 
The distributor creates and adds fake objects to the  
data that he distributes to agents. We let Fi _ Ri be the 
subset of fake objects that agent Ui receives. 
As discussed below, fake objects must be 
created carefully so that agents cannot distinguish them 
from real objects. In many cases, the distributor may be 
limited in how many fake objects he can create. For 
example, objects may contain email addresses, and 
each fake email address may require the creation of an 
actual inbox (otherwise the agent may discover the 
object is fake). The inboxes can actually be monitored 
by the distributor: if email is received from someone 
other than the agent who was given the address, it is 
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evidence that the address was leaked. Since creating 
and monitoring email accounts consumes resources, 
the distributor may have a limit of fake objects. If there is 
a limit, we denote it by B fake objects. Similarly, the 
distributor may want to limit the number of fake objects 
received by each agent, so as to not arouse suspicions 
and to not adversely impact the agent’s activities. Thus, 
we say that the distributor can send up to bi fake objects 
to agent Ui Creation. 
The creation of fake but real-looking objects  is 
a non-trivial problem whose thorough investigation  is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we model the 
creation of a fake object for agent Ui as a black-box 
function CREATE FAKE OBJECT(Ri; Fi; Condi) that 
takes as input the set of all objects Ri, the subset of  
fake objects.Fi that Ui has received so far and Condi, 
and returns anew fake object. This function needs  
Condi to produce a valid object that satisfies Ui’s 
condition. Set Ri is needed as input so that the created 
fake object is not only valid but also indistinguishable 
from other real objects. For example, the creation 
function of a fake payroll record that includes an 
employee rank and a salary attribute may take into 
account the distribution of employee ranks, the 
distribution of salaries as well as the correlation between 
the two attributes. Ensuring that key statistics do not 
change by the introduction of fake objects is important if 
the agents will be using such statistics in their work. 
II. Literature Survey 
a) Agent Guilt Model 
Suppose an agent Ui is guilty if it contributes 
one or more objects to the target. The event that agent 
Ui is guilty for a given leaked set  S diesnoted  by G        
i| S. The next step is to estimate Pr {Gi| S }, i.e., the 
probability that agentGi  is guilty given evidence S. 
To compute the Pr {Gi| S}, estimate the 
probability that  values  in  Sbcean “guessed”  by  the 
target. For instance, say some of the objects in t are 
emails of individuals. Conduct an experiment and ask   a 
person to find the email of say 100 individuals, the 
person may only discover say 20, leading to an estimate 
of 0.2. Call this estimate as pt, the probability that object 
t can be guessed by the target. 
The two assumptions regarding the relationship 
among the various leakage events. 
Assumption 1: For all t, t ∈ S such that t ≠ T the 
provenance of t is independent of the provenance of T. 
The term provenance in this assumption 
statement refers to the source of a value t that appears  
in the leaked set. The source can be any of the agents 
who have t in their sets or the target itself. 
Assumption 2: An object t ∈ S can only be obtained by 
the target in one of two ways. 
• A single agent Ui leaked t from its own Ri set, or 
• The target guessed (or obtained through other 
means) t without the help of any of the n agents. 
To find the probability that an agent Ui is  guilty 
given a set S, consider the target guessed t1 with  
probability p and that agent leaks t1 to  Sthweith 
probability 1-p. First compute the probability that he 
leaks a single object t to S. To compute this, define the 
set of agents Vt= {Ui | t<-Rt} that have t in their data 
sets. Then using Assumption 2 and known probability  
p, 
We have,
 
Pr {some agent leaked t to S} = 1- p (1.1)
 
Assuming that all agents that belong to Vt can 
leak t to S with equal probability and using Assumption 
2 obtain,
 
 
Pr {Ui  leaked t to S} =               (1.2) 
Given that agent
 
Ui is guilty if he leaks at least 
one value to S, with Assumption 1 and Equation 1.2 
compute the probability Pr { Gr| S}, agentUi  is guilty,
 
 
Pr {Gi| S}  
b)
 
Data Allocation Problem
 
The distributor “intelligently” gives
 
data to 
agents in order to improve the chances of detecting a 
guilty agent. There are four instances of this problem, 
depending on the type of data requests made  by  
agents and whether “fake objects” [4] are allowed. 
Agent makes two types of requests, called sample and 
explicit. Based on the requests the fakes objects are 
added to data list.
 
Fake objects are objects generated by the 
distributor that are not in set T. The objects are designed 
to look like real objects, and are distributed to agents 
together with the T objects, in order to increase the 
chances of detecting agents that leak data.
 
c)
 
Optimization Problem
 
The distributor’s data allocation
 
to  agents  has 
one constraint and one objective. The distributor’s 
constraint is to satisfy agents’ requests,
 
by providing 
them with the number of objects they request or with all 
available objects that satisfy their conditions. His 
objective is to be able to detect an agent who leaks any 
portion of his data.
 
We consider the constraint as strict. The 
distributor may not deny serving  an  agent  request  
and may not provide agents with different perturbed 
versions of the same objects. The fake object 
distribution as the only possible constraint relaxation. 
The objective is to maximize the chances of detecting a 
guilty agent that leaks all his data objects.
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Data Leakage Detection
 (1.3)
The Pr {Gi |S =Ri } or simply Pr {Gi |Ri } is  the 
probability that agent Ui is guilty if the distributor 
discovers a leaked table S that contains all Ri objects. 
The difference functions Δ ( i, j ) is defined as: 
Δ (i, j) = Pr {Gi |Ri  } – Pr {G |Ri } (1.4) 
i. Problem Definition 
Let the distributor have data requests from n 
agents. The distributor wants to give tables 
R1, .Rn. to agents, U1 . . . , Un 
respectively, so that 
• Distribution satisfies agents’ requests; and 
• Maximizes the guilt probability differences Δ (i, j) for 
all i, j = 1. . . n and i= j. 
Assuming that the sets satisfy the agents’ 
requests, we can express the problem as a multi- 
criterion 
ii. Optimization Problem 
Maximize (. . . , Δ (i, j), . . .) i! = j
 (Over R1,….., Rn,) 
The approximation  [3]   of   objective   of   the 
above equation does not depend on agent’s 
probabilities and therefore minimize the relative  overlap 
among the agents as 
Minimize (. . . ,( |Ri∩Rj|) / Ri  , . . . ) i != j (1.6) 
(over R1 , . . . ,Rn )  
This approximation is valid if minimizing the 
relative overlap, ( |Ri∩Rj|) / Ri   maximizes Δ ( i, j ). 
III. Allocation  Strategies Algorithm 
There are two types of strategies algorithms
 
a) Explicit data Request 
In case of explicit data request with fake not 
allowed, the distributor is not allowed to add fake 
objects to the distributed data. So Data allocation is fully 
defined by the agent’s data request. In case of explicit 
data request with fake allowed, the distributor cannot 
remove or alter the requests R from the agent. However 
distributor can add the fake object. 
In algorithm for data allocation for explicit 
request, the input to this is a set of requestR1, R2,……, 
Rn from n agents and different conditions for requests. 
The e-optimal algorithm finds the agents that are eligible 
to receiving fake objects. Then create one fake object in 
iteration and allocate it to the agent selected. The e-
optimal algorithm minimizes every term of the objective  
summation  by  adding  maximum  number  bi of fake 
objects to every set Ri yielding optimal solution.
 
Algorithm 1 : Allocation for Explicit Data Requests (EF)
 
Input:
 
R1, . . . , Rn, cond1, . . . , condn, b1, . . . ,bn, B
 
Output: R1, . . . , Rn, F1,. . . ,Fn
 
Step 1: R    Ø , Agents that can receive fake objects 
Step 2: for i = 1,……., n do 
Step 3: if bi > 0 then 
Step 4: R R U {i}  
Step 5: Fi Ø; Step 6: while B > 0 do  
Step 7: i SELECTAGENT(R,R1,……..,Rn)  
Step 8: f CREATEFAKEOBJECT (Ri, Fi, 
condi) 
Step 9: Ri Ri U {i} 
Step 10: Fi Fi U {i} 
Step 11: bi bi - 1  
Step 12: if bi = 0 then  
Step 13: R R \ {Ri}  
Step 14: B B – 1.  
Algorithm 2 : Agent Selection for e-random  
Step 1: function SELECTAGENT(R,R1,……,Rn)  
Step 2: i select at random an agent from R  
Step 3: return I 
 Algorithm 3: Agent selection for e-optimal 
Step 1: function SELECTAGENT(R;R1; : : : ;Rn) 
Step 2: i 
   
 
Step 3: return i ; 
b) Sample Data Request 
With sample data requests, each agent Ui may 
receive any T from a subset out of    different ones. 
Hence,there are      different allocations.In every 
allocation, the distributor can permute T objects and 
keep the same chances of guilty agent detection. The 
reason is that the guilt probability depends only on 
which agents have received the leaked objects and not 
on the identity of the leaked objects. Therefore, from the 
 
Algorithm 4: Allocation for Sample Data Requests (SF)
 
Input:
 
m1, . . . , mn, |T| .  Assuming mi <=|T|
 
Output: R1,……..,Rn
 
Step 1:
 
a       0|T|   . a[k]:number of agents who
 
have received object tk
 
Step 2:
 
R1,……….,Rn  ;
 
Step 3:
 
remaining
 
Step 4:
 
while remaining > 0 do
 
Step 5:
 
for all i = 1,….., n : |Ri| < mi do
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Data Leakage Detection
(1.5)  
argmax ( ) |Ri’    Rj|
i’:R R
distributor’s  perspective  there  are   
different allocations. An object allocation that satisfies 
requests and ignores the distributor’s objective is  to 
give each agent a unique subset of T of size m. The s-
max algorithm allocates to an agent the data record that 
yields the minimum increase of the maximum relative 
overlap among any pair of agents. The s-max algorithm 
is as follows.
Step 6: k    SELECTOBJECT (i, Ri). May also use 
additional parameters 
Step 7: Ri Ri U {tk} 
Step 8: a[k] a[k] + 1 
Step 9: remaining       remaining – 1.  
Algorithm 5 : Object Selection for s-random  
Step 1: function SELECTOBJECT(i , Ri) 
Step 2: k      select at random an element from 
             set{  k’ |  tk’ Ri } 
Step 3: return k. 
Algorithm 6 : Object Selection for s-overlap 
Step 1: function SELECTOBJECT(i;Ri; a)  
Step 2: K {k | k = argmin a[k’]}  
Step 3: k select at random an element from  
               set {k’ |  k’    K ^ tk’   Ri} 
Step 4: return k. 
 
 
Step 2: min_ overlap     1 . The minimum out of  the 
maximum relative   overlaps that the allocations of 
different objects to Ui yield 
Step 3: for  k    {k’ | tk’ Ri } do 
Step 4: max_ rel_ ov 0. The maximum relative 
overlap between Ri and any set Rj that the allocation of 
tk to Ui yields 
Step 5: for all j = 1,…………, n : j   i and tk   Rj 
do 
Step 6: abs_ ov | Ri     Rj | + 1 
Step 7: rel_ ov abs_ ov /min (mi , mj )  
Step 8: max_ rel_ ov  MAX(max_rel_ov ,  
rel_ov) 
Step 9: if  max_ rel_ ov  <= min_ overlap then 
Step 10: min_overlap        max_ rel_ ov  
Step 11: ret_ k       k 
Step 12: return ret_ k. 
IV. Existing System 
There are conventional techniques being used 
and include technical and fundamental analysis. The 
main issue with these techniques is that they are manual 
and need laborious work along with experience. 
Traditionally, leakage detection is  handled  by 
watermarking, e.g., a unique code is embedded in each 
distributed copy. If that copy is later discovered   in the 
hands of an unauthorized party, the leaker can   be 
identified. Watermarks can be very useful in some 
cases, but again, involve some modification of the 
original data. Furthermore, watermarks can sometimes 
be destroyed if the data recipient is malicious.  E.g.  .   A  
hospital  may  give  patient  records  to  researchers 
who will devise new treatments. Similarly, a company 
may have partnerships with other companies that 
require sharing customer data. Another enterprise may 
outsource its data processing, so data must be given to 
various other companies[4]. 
We call the owner of the data the distributor and 
the supposedly trusted third parties the  agents.  The 
distributor gives the data to the agents. These data will 
be watermarked.  Watermarking  is  the  process  of  
embedding  the  name  or  information  regarding  the 
company. The examples include the pictures we have 
seen in the internet. The authors of the pictures are 
watermarked within it.  If anyone  tries  to  copy  the 
picture or data the watermark will be present. And thus 
the data may be unusable by the leakers. 
a) Disadvantage 
This data is vulnerable to attacks. There are 
several techniques by which the watermark can be 
removed. Thus the data will be vulnerable to attacks. 
V. Proposed System 
We propose data allocation strategies (across 
the agents) that improve the probability of identifying 
leakages. These methods do not rely on alterations of 
the released data (e.g., watermarks).  In some cases we 
can also inject “realistic but fake” data records to further 
improve our chances of detecting leakage and 
identifying the guilty party. We also present algorithm for 
distributing object to agent. 
Our goal is to detect when the distributor’s 
sensitive data has been leaked by agents, and if 
possible to identify the agent that leaked the data. 
Perturbation is a very useful technique where the data is 
modified and made ‘less sensitive´ before being 
handed to agents. We develop unobtrusive techniques 
for detecting leakage of a set of objects or records. In 
this section   we develop a model for assessing the 
‘guilt´ of agents. We also present algorithms for  
distributing  objects  to agents, in a way that improves 
our chances of identifying a leaker.
 
Finally, we also consider the option of adding 
’fake´ objects to the distributed set. Such objects do not 
correspond to real entities but appear realistic    to the 
agents. In a sense, the fake objects acts as a type of 
watermark for the entire set, without modifying any 
individual members. If it turns out an agent was
 
given 
one or more fake objects that were leaked, then the 
distributor can be more confident that agent was guilty. 
Today the advancement in technology made the 
watermarking system a simple technique of data 
authorization. There are various software which can 
remove the watermark from the data and makes the  
data as original[5].
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Data Leakage Detection
  
  
Algorithm 7 : Object Selection for s-max
Step1: function SELECTOBJECT(i, 
R1,…….,Rn ,m1,……..,mn)
a) Advantage 
This system includes the data hiding along with 
the provisional software with which only the data can be 
accessed. This system gives privileged access    to the 
administrator (data distributor) as well as the agents 
registered by the distributors. Only registered agents 
can access the system. The user accounts can be 
activated as well as cancelled. The exported file will   be 
accessed only by the system. The agent has given only 
the permission to access the software and view   the 
data. The data can be copied by our software. If the 
data is copied to the agent’ system the path and agent 
information will be sent to the distributors email id 
thereby the identity of the leaked user can be traced[2]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration Diagram 
 
Figure 2: System Architecture Design 
b)
 
System Implementation
 
The implementation stage involves careful 
planning, investigation of the existing system and it’s 
constraints on implementation, designing of methods   
to achieve changeover and evaluation of changeover 
methods.
 
 
i. Modules 
(1) Data Allocation Module, 
(2) Data Distribution Module, 
(3) Data Leakage & Detection Module. 
ii. Module Description 
  
 
 
2. Data Distribution Module 
Once the agent has been added by the 
administrator, he can create one username and 
password for that particular agent, in fact registering. 
After the agent has been successfully registered  we 
now want to send the data to agent according to their 
request. Administrator will now select a requested 
amount of data and then export these data into an  excel 
file in byte format. After the file is created, the 
administrator will send the data to agent. Sending the 
data includes transferring the data through the network 
(LAN).At the same time the administrator will keep the 
record of the agent with his id. 
3.
 
Data Leakage and Detection Module
 
Agent can login with their given username and 
password. Now they can view the data that is being sent 
by the administrator, but they cannot edit nor do any 
changes with it. He can now copy the data anywhere   
he wants to. The path and the agent which is copying 
the file will be recorded and the notification is sent 
through e-mail. Whenever a guilty agent tries to send the 
data to any other anonymous user i.e. leaking the data, 
a notification will be sent through email. The 
administrator has an email id with
 
all the notifications, 
including the path to which the data is saved along with 
agent id[6].
 
 
Figure3:
 
Login for Distributor & Agent
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Data Leakage Detection
1. Data Allocation Module
In this module, administrator has to login with 
his id and password. Administrator has all the agent 
information, user data inside his database. Administrator 
is now able to view the database consisting of the 
original data as well as the fake data.
Administrator can also list the agents here.  He 
will be able to add additional information to the 
database. Agent’s information can be added here.
 Figure 4: Distributor Login
 
Figure 5:
 
Distributor Function
 
 
 
Figure 6:  The Agent Detai in Database Table 
  
 
Figure 7:
 
Distributor Sending Data to Agent
 
 
Figure 8:  Selection of Agent Side Path 
Figure 9:
 
Conformation of Data Reception
 
  
Figure 10: Transfer Data to the Agent is Saved in Record 
of Distributor Data
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Agent to Agent Data Transfer
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Figure12:
 
Data Leakage can seen in Agent Guilt Model
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Agent Record 
  
Figure 14:  Find Probability of Agent Guilt Model 
Figure 15: Draw Graph of Guilty Model
 
VI. Future Work 
The notion of a trusted environment is 
somewhat fluid. The departure of a trusted staff member 
with access to sensitive information can become a data 
breach if the staff member retains access to the data 
subsequent to termination of the  trust relationship. In  
distributed  systems,  this  can  also occur with a break 
down in a web of trust. Most such incidents publicized in 
the media involve private information on individuals, i.e. 
social security numbers, etc Loss of corporate 
information such as trade secrets, sensitive corporate 
information, details of contracts, etc or of government 
information is frequently unreported, as there is no 
compelling reason to do so in the  absence of potential 
damage to private citizens, and the publicity around 
such an event may be more damaging than the loss of 
the data itself. 
Although such incidents pose the risk of identity 
theft or other serious consequences, in most cases 
there is no lasting damage; either the breach in security 
is remedied before the information is accessed by 
unscrupulous people, or the thief is only interested in the 
hardware stolen, not the data it contains. Never the less, 
when such incidents become publicly known, it is  
customary  for  the  offending  party  to  attempt to 
mitigate damages by providing to the victims 
subscription to a credit reporting agency, for instance. 
VII.
 
Conclusion
 
In a perfect world there would  be  no  need to 
hand over sensitive data to agents that may 
unknowingly or maliciously leak it. And even if we had to 
handover sensitive data, in a perfect world we could 
watermark each object so that we could trace its origins 
with absolute certainty. However, in many cases we 
must indeed work with agents that may not be 100% 
trusted.
 
In spite of these difficulties, we have shown   it 
is possible  to  assess  the  likelihood  that  an  agent  is 
responsible for  a  leak,  based  on  the  overlap  of  his 
data with the leaked data and the data of other agents, 
and based on the probability that objects can    be 
‘guessed´ by other means. Our model is relatively 
simple, but we believe it captures the essential trade- 
offs. The algorithms we have presented implement a 
variety of data distribution strategies that can improve 
the distributor’s chances of identifying a leaker. We have 
shown that distributing objects judiciously can make a 
significant difference in identifying guilty agents, 
especially in cases where there is large overlap in the 
data that agents must receive. It includes the 
investigation of agent guilt models that capture leakage 
scenarios that are not studied in this paper.
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